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Microsimulation study of the release of pneumonic plague and smallpox on a
synthetic civilian population
Abstract
The confrontation in Syria is a cause for concern over the use of chemical and biological weapons. There
have been reports of the use of chemical weapons including Sarin. While both sides accuse each other,
there is very little ground evidence at this time (August 2013) to substantiate claims or to determine who
is involved. Their use would demonstrate a total disregard for civilian casualties and UN conventions.
Syria is thought to have stockpiles of a number of agents including anthrax, plague, tularaemia,
botulinium, smallpox and cholera (Gordon, 2007). Some groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda might also have
access to some of these through their terrorist networks. If chemical weapons have been used by either
side, then the potential use of biological weapons cannot be disregarded. Of concern is whether the
response to an attack involving a single agent would be the same as when more than one agent is used.
While there are a number of papers on the management of both smallpox and plague (Halloran, (2002),
Rani et al, (2004)), there are few, if any, which discuss joint infection or the likely confounding factors that
will affect outcomes in their post attack management. In this paper we explore the application of
microsimulation modelling of a joint attack on a civilian population using plague and smallpox as an
example. The literature suggests that plague affects the innate immune system by suppressing cytokine
responses while smallpox activates the cytokine response. The possible interaction between the two
diseases in people who are infected with both diseases is examined and its effect on the spread of
disease and number of deaths. The simulations involve a population of 1250 people based on NSW
statistics for households and work. The structure of a community model of social mixing is briefly
discussed, over which a multi-infection model is imposed that accounts for varying infectivity in different
stages of each disease as well as confinement to home as each disease progresses. A number of
simulations were run, assuming 10% immunity to both diseases, to establish a baseline for each disease
in the community. Further simulations where both are released together with delay of the introduction of
plague compared to smallpox of 0 and 35 days respectively. The strength of the interaction by smallpox
on plague deaths was also investigated. The outcome is complex as the number of deaths is dependent
on the delay in the release of plague and varies according to the number of people progressing through
the active release locations that can infect them. Additionally confinement to their household during the
later stages of both diseases reduces the number of susceptible people in the general community
although it still allows for spread to other household members. It was found that the number of joint
infections was about 10% of the total number infected and that the reduction in deaths from plague where
the two infections were present also depended on how many smallpox cases were at the correct stage of
development compared to the plague infection. We believe that the use of microsimulation has a benefit
in that many of the human factors that affect delay in control and hence the size of any epidemic can be
easily incorporated into the simulation without affecting the other components of the simulation. For
example, vaccine and drug supply can be added as additional peeps that move to hospitals or doctors'
surgeries and then interact with the human population through creation of additional states based on
these locations. Further work is planned to assess the impact of these human factors on preventing
epidemic spread as well as assessing current WHO guidelines for each disease. The intention is to
develop well understood protocols for application both within and outside of conflict areas. Progress on
this will be reported at the conference.
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Abstract:
The confrontation in Syria is a cause for concern over the use of chemical and biological weapons. There
have been reports of the use of chemical weapons including Sarin. While both sides accuse each other, there
is very little ground evidence at this time (August 2013) to substantiate claims or to determine who is
involved. Their use would demonstrate a total disregard for civilian casualties and UN conventions. Syria is
thought to have stockpiles of a number of agents including anthrax, plague, tularaemia, botulinium, smallpox
and cholera (Gordon, 2007). Some groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda might also have access to some of these
through their terrorist networks. If chemical weapons have been used by either side, then the potential use of
biological weapons cannot be disregarded.
Of concern is whether the response to an attack involving a single agent would be the same as when more
than one agent is used. While there are a number of papers on the management of both smallpox and plague
(Halloran, (2002), Rani et al, (2004)), there are few, if any, which discuss joint infection or the likely
confounding factors that will affect outcomes in their post attack management. In this paper we explore the
application of microsimulation modelling of a joint attack on a civilian population using plague and smallpox
as an example. The literature suggests that plague affects the innate immune system by suppressing cytokine
responses while smallpox activates the cytokine response. The possible interaction between the two diseases
in people who are infected with both diseases is examined and its effect on the spread of disease and number
of deaths.
The simulations involve a population of 1250 people based on NSW statistics for households and work. The
structure of a community model of social mixing is briefly discussed, over which a multi-infection model is
imposed that accounts for varying infectivity in different stages of each disease as well as confinement to
home as each disease progresses. A number of simulations were run, assuming 10% immunity to both
diseases, to establish a baseline for each disease in the community. Further simulations where both are
released together with delay of the introduction of plague compared to smallpox of 0 and 35 days
respectively. The strength of the interaction by smallpox on plague deaths was also investigated.
The outcome is complex as the number of deaths is dependent on the delay in the release of plague and varies
according to the number of people progressing through the active release locations that can infect them.
Additionally confinement to their household during the later stages of both diseases reduces the number of
susceptible people in the general community although it still allows for spread to other household members.
It was found that the number of joint infections was about 10% of the total number infected and that the
reduction in deaths from plague where the two infections were present also depended on how many smallpox
cases were at the correct stage of development compared to the plague infection.
We believe that the use of microsimulation has a benefit in that many of the human factors that affect delay
in control and hence the size of any epidemic can be easily incorporated into the simulation without affecting
the other components of the simulation. For example, vaccine and drug supply can be added as additional
peeps that move to hospitals or doctors’ surgeries and then interact with the human population through
creation of additional states based on these locations.
Further work is planned to assess the impact of these human factors on preventing epidemic spread as well as
assessing current WHO guidelines for each disease. The intention is to develop well understood protocols for
application both within and outside of conflict areas. Progress on this will be reported at the conference.
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INTRODUCTION

The current conflict in Syria has raised the serious issue of the use of chemical and biological weapons on
civilian populations. Reports in the media have intimated that chemical weapons have been used in the
conflict whilst urging caution in the interpretation of these reports. The more serious risk, because it has the
potential to spread rapidly outside the conflict area, is the use of biological weapons. Syria is thought to have
stockpiles of a number of agents including anthrax, plague, tularaemia, botulinium, smallpox and cholera
(Gordon, 2007). These may also be available to other groups but a counterview suggests that biological
weapons might not have been fully developed and non-state groups would not have the technology to home
develop such weapons (Leitenberg, 2005). While the quality and viability of these stockpiles are unknown,
and the difficulties in weaponising them documented, both state and non-state actors, through their state
sponsors, might also have access to these weapons.
If their use is a credible possibility it raises the question of how release in a conflict zone can be countered
effectively, particularly as refugee camps have extremely high population densities. Local and international
response agencies will be stretched by a biological epidemic occurring in the context of other conflict-related
issues. The principle impact will be on their ability to contact-trace cases to control the epidemic. Similarly,
supplies of anti-bacterials and vaccines may not be readily available, necessitating their importation from
international stockpiles and delaying their application. There have been several numerical studies of the
spread and control of smallpox and plague, such as Halloran, (2002) and Rani et al, (2004), where the authors
have used stochastic methods either to evaluate intervention strategies for control of outbreaks or to estimate
the number of infectids1 hidden from authorities in a community once the disease outbreak had occurred.
Intervention strategies tended to be modelled on common procedures for tracing, vaccination and isolation of
contacts. While many of these recommendations may work well in Western, non-conflict situations, conflict
areas have problems that delay surveillance, delay access to medication and restrict the quantity and quality
of trained staff. In addition the presentation of more than one disease may confound treatments.
In this paper we present development of our microsimulation framework, Simulacron, (Keep, 2012) to multiinfections with a preliminary investigation into the building of a model for studying the impact of multiple
biological weapons releases on a population. In the work reported here we have used plague and smallpox as
two indicative and plausible biological weapons.
2.

SIMULATION OF MULTI-INFECTION IN A COMMUNITY

Three essential components are required to simulate multi-infection spread within a community at the level
of the individual.
First, a description of the community though which the infection will spread. This includes breaking down a
population into age- and work-based compartments. The community model used in this study is based on the
2011 census data for NSW (ABS, 2012) and employment statistics for NSW (ABS, 2012a).2 Each member of
the population is assigned to a household that matches NSW housing statistics and to a location, such as a
school or place of work. These locations are associated with one of six compartments that are used to assign
schedules for each individual: infants, primary school and secondary school children, full time employed,
part time employed and unemployed including retirees. Workplace structures, like their household
counterparts, conform to the overall industry sector statistics.
Second, a model of social mixing that emulates the complex patterns of locational behavior such as going to
work, school or eating out at lunch or dinner. In the simulation this mixing occurs through a hierarchical
structure of daily and weekly schedules. A daily schedule is chosen at random from a list of potential
schedules that is dependent on the type of person and the day of the week and these are then combined into a
weekly schedule. These selections for example take account of days off or sick days for full time employed
or the sport activities of children on the weekend. Each daily schedule randomly selects the timing of events
within time periods during the day, such as the start of work or lunch, and the place where this occurs.
Individuals are moved by teleportation at each event time. 3 Figure 1 is an example of a daily schedule for full
time work over a day. At each event time, a person has a choice of alternative activities which are preselected
1

An infectid is a person who has been infected with a disease.
A NSW community was chosen for convenience to progress understanding of the disease processes
involved. Conflict areas, however, occur all over the world and are not confined to places like Syria; for
example the Cronulla riots in NSW indicate that NSW is not immune.
3
A more detailed transport model involving path tracing, though available as a module within Simulacron, is
not used in this study.
2
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randomly for execution during the simulation. Complex mixing patterns occur from these very simple
constructs and these patterns mimic typical social behaviours.
Third, a multi-infection module that allows spread of diseases through the community. Each infection is
implemented as a chain model through six infection states (Green et al, 2011). As contact time is explicitly
modeled through the social mixing process, a probability of infection (infection chance) is used to spread the
disease and a probability of recovery allows progress to a state of either immunity or death. One innovation is
the ability to specify the infection probability as a relative force of infection (infection strength) by infectids
as shown by equation 1.
∑

eq(1)

Where AIC is the infection chance at a susceptible target with infection chance, TIC. Δt is the tick time interval
and tI is average infectious time. SIj is the infection strength of an infectious peep, j, with a compatible
infection mask within the cell. The sum is over all such infectious peeps. Infection is determined by selecting
a [0, 1) uniform random variate, and comparing it to AIC. If the random number is less than AIC, infection
spreads to the target peep.
The infection source is a biological weapon which can either be dropped randomly into an area or taken by a
person to a specific area of release. In this study we have randomly selected locations from the workplace
locations to emulate the former release mode rather than the latter which would tend to be targeted at specific
high density locations for maximal effect. The weapon source has its infection strength increased compared
to a natural outbreak of the disease in order to simulate an aerosolized weapon infecting individuals while
subsequent spread between individuals will be similar to natural outbreaks.
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Figure 1 An example of a daily schedule.

Figure 2 The State system for allowing interaction between Plague (YP) and Smallpox (VM)
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As plague has evolved to suppress the production of cytokines by the innate immune response (Li et al, 2008)
and smallpox promotes cytokine response (Fenner et al, 2013) there is the possibility that infection with both
diseases may alter the recovery outcomes, as the innate immune system works in opposite directions for the
two diseases. The use of additional states of infection extends the multi-infection module to allow
interactions between the infections. Figure 2 shows the basic infection states and their function. The potential
interaction is investigated in this paper. Triggers on change of infection state are used to place individuals
into states where the infections can interact within a person either increasing or decreasing the recovery rate,
depending on which infection occurred first. These triggers are also used to confine individuals to one of the
bedrooms in their house. While other options such as hospitalisation are possible, they have not been
modelled in this work. The actual model used is more complex than that shown in Figure 2: additional states
are required to take account of varying infectivity over the course of infection as discussed below.
3.

SIMULATIONS

The initial simulations involved a population of 1250 people in a small community. The two infections’
states and the recovery and infection probabilities are shown in Table 1 for individuals in the simulations.
Smallpox was eradicated in 1972 and current populations under the age about 40 would have no immunity.
Even those over that age are unlikely to have been vaccinated except when travelling to prone areas and, in a
bioweapons attack, the strain might not match the vaccination strains. The immunity to smallpox was
therefore assumed to be 10% for the population as a whole. While a more detailed model of immunity could
be constructed, the approach taken was considered to be reasonable given the variation in other parameters. A
similar value was used for immunity to pneumonic plague on the basis of sporadic natural outbreaks around
the world leaving most of the world’s population vulnerable. The infection strength was varied to account for
changes in infectivity during the course of the diseases. It was reduced to 50% during hero time to take
account of the increasing infectivity during the symptomatic phase of plague. With smallpox, the most
infectious period is the prodromal period and the infection strength decreases once the rash appears.
The bioweapon infections were modelled as a static person in a cell who had a latency period that matched
the time from the start of the simulation to the release of the weapon’s infection. This time was randomly
selected from within a time window and the location was randomly selected from the workplaces in the
simulation. The infectivity of the source was raised above 1.0, as shown in Table 1, to ensure a reasonable
spread within the community in order that other effects of the two diseases could be studied. 4 Other
parameters came from analysis of outbreaks that had occurred for the two diseases.
An analysis of generational infection in an outbreak of plague in Mukden, Manchuria in 1946 (Tieh et al,
1946) is shown in Figure 3. In this outbreak 43 people were infected among 83 contacts. While the text did
not explicitly state the contacts for the five that recovered, the text did allow identification of who was likely
to have infected them. The infection chance for the present study is based on the average infection rate
through the population in this case study.
Because the reproductive number (R0) in the literature for smallpox varied from 0 to 38 with a mean below 3
(Bhatnagaret al, 2006), an outbreak in Abakaliki, Nigeria, in 1967 was chosen to calibrate the infection rate
in a naïve population. In this outbreak, three population groups, a naïve population belonging to a Faith
group, a vaccinated group who lived in close proximity to the Faith group and a more general population who
also had a high vaccination rate were used. There was sufficient detail in the published outbreak to be able to
reconstruct the populations, their immunological status and their housing communities (Thompson et al,
1968, Ottenberg, 1960). The values for the infection in Table 1 were based upon this outbreak. Simulation of
the outbreak calibrated the infection chance and the other infection parameters.
In the simulations, people who became infected with smallpox had a 50% chance of confinement to their
home during the prodromal phase and 50% chance of confinement during the first observations of
progression of the disease (Halloran, 2002). With plague there was no asymptomatic infectious stage and it
was assumed that 50% of infectids would be home confined during hero time and 100% thereafter. The
variation in infection chance over the course of each disease increases the number of states required to 17
compared with Figure 2.
The initial simulations were undertaken to obtain a baseline for each infection separately. Figure 4 shows the
results where infection was started in five locations over a two hour period, 12 hours into the simulation.
Smallpox required lower infection strengths compared to plague to obtain infection of people in the locations.
4

This study is not concerned with the efficiency of weapons. Consequently, an infection chance was chosen
that consistently produced spread within the community for the two diseases.
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Variable

Plague

Smallpox

Latent time

100 ± 40 hours

330 ± 48 hours

Asymptomatic or
prodromal time

0 hours

50 ± 20 hours

Hero time

<24 hours

48 ± 13 hours

Infectious time

62 ± 30 hours

420 ± 60 hours

Immune
(assumed)

100000 hours

100000 hours

Infection chance

0.0022 ± 0.0003

0.01 ± 0.002

Recovery chance

0 - 0.1

0.6 - 0.7

Infection strength
of infected people

1 (0.5 during
hero time)

1 (0.2 during
infectious time)

Infection strength
of
the
initial
infecting source

1000

10

Table 1

time

Figure 1 The Mukden plague outbreak
1946

Infection Parameters

While smallpox tended to spread throughout the population, plague did not spread as much and exhibited
bimodal behavior. The frequency between the two modes is shown in Figure 4: about 2/3rd of simulations
showed low propagation. This behavior seems to be relative to the number of people going through the
release locations over the 2hr period the release was active. A larger population density might change this
finding.
Figure 5 shows the plague and smallpox outbreaks when there were five release points for each infection
over the same time period and the interaction was not considered. The high plague propagation has about 30
less infections on average than when it is the only disease and occurs for about 10 days longer. The smallpox
numbers are very similar to the single infection numbers but the main rise in the curve occurs a few days
later. Both infections are affected by home confinement reducing the susceptible population available for
further infection by a second infection as there is no interaction between the infections in this simulation.
Note that the plague still has bimodal behavior similar to the single outbreak in Figure 4, left.
A second series of simulations involved adding interaction parameters between plague and smallpox. This
was achieved by having two parameters controlling the change in recovery compared to no interaction for
each of the two diseases. Figure 6 shows the results for adjusting the strength of the interaction when
smallpox is caught first, leading to a reduction in the chance of death from plague. The simulations show that
while there is a reduction in plague deaths due to the delay in the release of plague, it is not clear how the
strength of the interaction between smallpox and plague is affecting the number of deaths.
Since any interaction in a double infection simulated here has to occur within a certain time period from
infection with smallpox, the number of smallpox cases that would influence the outcome of plague was
extracted from the simulations. In Figure 7 two sets of data are plotted against the number of plague deaths
for the release of plague on the 1st and 36th days of simulation: firstly the number of smallpox cases that result
in an interaction together with a regression estimate of the trend and secondly the effect of the reduction in
the chance of death. The simulations show that the number of plague deaths depends on the delay in release
of plague compared to smallpox as well as the strength of the interaction between the two diseases provided
that there are enough smallpox cases where the interaction can make a difference. Increasing the number of
available interactions does tend to decrease the number of deaths.
4.

DISCUSSION

These preliminary simulations have shown that it is possible to construct a community based infection model
based on individual spread of multiple diseases. In this case the two diseases, smallpox and plague, are
assumed to interact through different channels in the innate immune system. Quite complex outcomes can be
expected when more than one biological weapon is released into a conflict zone.
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Figure 4 Individual simulation of plague (left) and smallpox (right)

Figure 5 simultaneous releases of plague and smallpox

Figure 6 Deaths from Plague release 0 and 35 days
after start of simulation.

Figure 7 Number of smallpox infections that interact
with plague infection released at 0 and 35 days.

This has potential ramifications on emergency preparedness and practical steps that can be taken to reduce
mortality and morbidity.
Current WHO guidelines are based on accessible health professionals and the progress of individual diseases.
They also assume point entry between countries rather than regional phased movement across porous
borders. It also ignores two affects: the possibility of interaction between diseases (in this case through the
innate immune system) and the human behavior constraints in delivery of health care. The latter affects the
timing of the discovery of both diseases, the supply of drugs to the area, the presentation of patients at
doctors’ clinics or hospitals and the reluctance of health workers to volunteer to go to conflict zones;
particularly where approved preventative prophylaxis is not available, such as with plague.

A Green et al
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The use of microsimulation has a benefit in that many of the human factors can be easily incorporated into
the simulation without affecting the other components of the simulation. For example, vaccine and drug
supply can be added as additional peeps that move to hospitals or doctors’ surgeries and then interact with the
human population through creation of additional states based on these locations.
Further work is planned to assess the impact of these human factors on preventing epidemic spread within
and outside of conflict areas.
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